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Agency Character and Congressional 
Budget Cutting Behavior 
JOH WANAT 
University of Kentucky 
Interest in legislative-executive relations has recently found a focus in the 
budgetary process. In the last ten years, Davis, Fenno, Horn , Kirst, Shar -
kansky, Wildavsky, and Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky all have written of 
agency-Congressional relations in the budgeting arena. 1 To some degree they 
all note that the legislature almost invariably appropriates less than the agency 
requests . But the question of why Congress cuts a given agency's request as it 
does has not been fully considered. Therefore it is the intent of this paper to 
describe patterns in Congressional budget cutting and to present grounds that 
would allow more sophisticated explanation of the variation in cutting be-
havior than the literature has been able to offer. In particular, the adequacy of 
the agency's technology and the openendedness of its workload are proposed 
as explanatory variables. 
Previous work has shown sizable variations in the way agency requests are 
reduced by Congress . Fenno's study of 36 agencies from 1947 to 1962 exhib-
ited a range of 0% to 22% in the average cut made by the dominant House 
Appropriations Committee .2 Davis, Dempster , and Wildavsky, in studying 
56 agencies from 1947 to 1963, noted variation from 0% to 16% in the average 
cut made by Congress. 3 If one assumes that control over dollars is equivalent 
to control of policy , this variation shows differential overt Congressional 
involvement in one part of the policy process. Differential cutting implies that 
Congress restrains some agencies from carrying out their desired programs 
while allowing other agencies their head. It also suggests that the often 
painted picture of executive dominance over Congress may be inaccurate. If 
1 David Howard Davis, "The Price of Power : The Appropriations Process for Seventeen 
Foreign Affairs Agencies ," Public Policy, X:Vlll (Spring , 1970); "A Theory of the Budgetary 
Process," APSR , LX (Sept ember , 1966) 529-547; Richard Fenno , The Power of the Purse: 
Appropriations Politics in Congress, (Boston: Littl e, Brown, 1966); Stephen Hom , Unused 
Power: The Work of the Senate Committ ee on Appropriation s, (Washington : The Brookings 
Institution , 1970); Michael Kirst , Gooernment Without Passing Laws: Congress' Nonstatuatory 
Techniqu es for Appropriations Control , (Chapel Hill , orth Carolina : The University of orth 
Carolina Press , 1969); Ira Sharkansky , "Four Agencies and Appropriations Subcommittee: A 
Comparativ e Study of Budget Strategies ," Midwest Journal of Political Science, IX (1965), 
254-281; Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, (Boston: Little , Brown, 1964). 
Otto Davis, M.A.H. Dempst er, and Aaron Wildavsky, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process ," 
American Political Science Reoiew, LX (September , 1966) 529-547. 
2 Fenno , p. 368. 
3 Otto A. Davis , M.A. H. Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky , "On the Process of Budgeting: 
An Empiri cal Study of Congr essional Appropriation ," pp . 102-113 in Gordon Tullock, ed ., Papers 
on Non-Market Decision Making (Charlott esville, Virginia: Thomas Jefferson Center , 1966). 
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Congress can thwart executive branch desires for expansion, it may not be as 
impotent as the folklore suggests. Clearly, then, explaining why Congress cuts 
as it does is of interest and importance. 
What determines why Congress will cut one agency's budget request on 
the average of2% and another's an average of 10%? Certainly the cut inflicted 
on an agency's request can be a function of many variables. Temporary agency 
visibility and topicality, Presidential-Congressional feuding, or national suc-
cess (or scandal) in an agency's bailiwick all can cause or explain variation in 
Congressional treatment of an agency's request. Although such relatively 
idiosyncratic events can be important, they are not of much help in explaining 
consistently severe or lenient cutting patterns. To explain such patterns 
factors more permanent than topicality or political "bad blood" must be relied 
upon. For this reason cutting behavior must be related to classes of agencies , 
characteristics of Congress, and sets of circumstances before law-like 
generalizations can be made. 
To explain Congressional budget behavior we must consider Congress' 
value structure. Knowing what values Congress seeks to implement or op-
timize, and assuming these are consistent, theoretically allows one to predict 
how Congress will act. While it is perhaps simplistic to assume that all 
Congressional cutting behavior can be explained on the basis of one or a few 
values, this paper proposes to see how far such an approach can go. 
One value frequently ascribed to Congress is a drive for economy and 
efficiency. Its unwillingness to raise taxes and its reluctance to increase 
spending (unless there is strong constituency pressure) indicate a desire for 
economy. The existence of standing Government Operations Committees in 
both Houses whose work involves executive oversight signals an in-
stitutionalized Congressional drive for executive branch efficiency. Similarly , 
the pre-eminent Congressional agency, the General Accounting Office, sym-
bolizes Congressional interest in economy and efficiency in the Federal 
government. All of these facts lend support to the reasonableness of using 
economy and efficiency as a base value in our characterization of Congress. 
The budgeting literature corroborates this point of view. Richard Fenno 
feels that the House has an economizing , efficiency and business-like orienta-
tion. 4 Stephen Horn argues that although the Senate has a similar outlook , it 
holds it less tenaciously than the House. 5 And David Howard Davis' study of 
the budgetary experiences of foreign affairs agencies agrees with Fenno 's 
conclusion about Congressional affection for business-like agency operation. 6 
Unfortunately, neither Davis' nor Fenno's work presents strong evidence to 
confirm their statements. Fenno himself admits the exploratory and tentative 
nature of his generalizations about types of agencies and committee treat-
ment. 7 
4 Fenno , p . 30, pp . 124-126, 315-320. 
5 Hom , pp. 82-88. 
6 David Howard Davis , "The Price of Power." 
7 Fenno , pp. 411-413. 
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If Congress as a whole, and most particularly its appropriations commit-
tees, has an efficiency and economy orientation, how would this influence 
budget cutting behavior? It logically follows that requests coming from agen-
cies that function efficiently would be leniently viewed by Congress. Simi-
larly, if an agency does not have an efficient operation or appears to spend an 
inordinate amount of money, Congress would act by severely reducing the 
budget request. 
More specifically, what does Congress look for in order to decide whether 
an agency acts in accord with an efficiency orientation? We present two 
characteristics now, each of which follows from the efficiency orientation 
imputed to Congress. Later in the paper we present material to illustrate that 
these characteristics have some grounding in reality, i.e., that the agencies 
and Congress are aware of and think, at least occasionally, in terms of these 
characteristics. 
One agency characteristic Congress favors was noted by Fenno. He main-
tains that an agency with a well-defined workload is treated better by the 
House Appropriations Committee than one with an open-ended workload or 
task. 8 Where there is a well-defined task for the agency, such as processing 
income tax returns, there is less likelihood of waste than in an activity like 
furthering intergovernmental relations. Where the agency workload can be 
easily identified and perhaps even quantified , Congress can determine if the 
money requested is justified. The agency, knowing that such analysis is 
possible, will more likely than not submit an "honest" budget with little 
padding. Congress therefore would have little cutting discretion and will 
reduce the request by only a small amount. The demand for economy there-
fore makes agency workload a point worth considering. 
The efficiency orientation of Congress means that attention will be paid to 
how well the job is being done. Thompson and Bates would concur with the 
statement that technology is an important variable in Congressional executive 
interaction because they feel that in general the kind of technology utilized by 
an organization has important implications for the relation between the or-
ganization and its environment. 9 In the case of government agencies this is 
particularly important. Norton Long and Matthew Holden, for instance , both 
argue that power is crucial to administrative agencies .10 Since an agency's 
power is based on its constituencies, 11 what the agency can deliver should be 
central to the agency-legislative nexus , because the ability to "deliver" means 
that agency clients will not complain to a Congress that can punish an agency 
by mangling its budget request s. Consequently Congressional assessment of 
• Ibid ., pp . 370-377 . 
9 James D . Thompson and Fr eder ick L. Bates, "Tec hnology, Organ ization , and Adminis -
tration ," Administrative Science Quarterly , II (Dece mber, 1957) 325-43. 
10 Mort on Long, "Power and Admini stration ," Public Administration Review, IX (Autumn , 
1949), 257-264 and Matth ew Hold en, Jr ., " 'Imp erialism ' in Bureaucracy," American Political 
Science Review, LX (1966) 943-51. 
11 H olden, p . 944. 
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the adeq~acy of the agency's technology should be related to variations in 
cutting behavior. 
Certainly the kind of managerial skills possessed by agency administrators 
will have an impact on the agency's ability to perform. But this impact would 
be to dull or sharpen the basic technological capabilities of the agency. Some 
bureaus simply cannot fully carry out their mandate because they lack the 
necessary tools. For example , there is a major difference between the ability 
of the Public llealth Service to stop or even retard the transmission of 
venereal disease and the ability of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing to 
make perfect dollar bills. No matter how zealous the agents of the communi-
cable disease center or how diligent the administrators of the Public Health 
Service , they will be unable to stop the spread of syphilis, while with compara-
tively little effort , near perfect currency is produced in the Treasury Depart-
ment . The technologies utilized by the two agencies make the crucial differ-
ence. 
As will be illustrated below, Congress is aware of the differences in the 
technologies used by various agencies. The economy and efficiency orienta-
tion of Congress suggests that that body would be more lenient toward an 
agency that has a technology adequate to its mandated task than it would be 
toward one whose technology is inadequate. 
To summarize and formalize our hypotheses about budget cutting , 
Hypothesis 1: Budget requests for activities having a fixed workload will 
be cut less, on the average, than requests for activities with 
an open-ended workload. 
Hypothesis 2: Budget requests for activities utilizing a technology 
adequate to their mandated goals will be cut less , on the 
average, than requests for activities whose technologies 
are not adequate to their goals . 
METHODOLOGY 
In what way would Congressional "leniency" or "severity" be shown? How 
will the budget cut be operationalized? To answer those questions we build on 
the work of Davis , Dempster, and Wildavsky. Their research , alluded to 
earlier, showed that the basic relation between Congress and the agencies was 
of the form: 
APPROPRIATION = /3 · REQUEST 
Their analysis of all 116 non-defense agencies showed that the relation ex-
pressed by the equation above was the best approximation to reality in 68 
cases. The remaining 48 agencies' budget relations were minor modifications 
of the above equation. 12 
12 Otto A. Davis, M .A.H . Dempster , and Aaron Wildavsky , "On the Process of Budgeting 
ll: An Empirical Study of Congressional Appropriations ," pp. 292-375 in R. F . Byrne, A Charnes 
W . W . Cooper , 0. A. Davis, and Dorothy Gilford , eds. , Studi es in Budgeting (Amsterdam and 
New York: North-Holland Publishing Company , 1971), p. 307. 
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If A is the appropriation and R the request, then C, the cut, would be 
R - A. Therefore, the equation, A = {3 · R, could be rewritten as 
C = (1 - /3) · R, which says that the cut is proportional to the request in raw 
dollars. Since Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky's data and Fenno's work 
showed that Congress almost invariably cuts from the request, our basic 
cutting relation would be CUT= a· REQUEST, where O ~a< 1. We 
seek to explain why the "a's" differ from agency to agency. 
This research is not completely parallel to that of Davis, Dempster, and 
Wildavsky. Our model is analogous to their basic model, the one that 
"explained" best for 68 of their 116 agencies. We use this si!fiple model of the 
cutting relation because our purpose is to explain variation in cutting from 
agency to agency; this requires that the cutting models be the same for all 
agencies. Secondly, the models reflecting "reality" best in 48 of the 116 
agencies were minor modifications of the basic model. Therefore any error of 
misrepresentation would be only minimal. 
It is tempting to use the variables as defined by Davis, Dempster and 
Wildavsky to investigate differential cutting behavior but we do not do so. The 
reason for transforming the variables above was to focus on the amount cut, 
rather than the total amount appropriated. That was done because the cut 
reflects the increment Congress removed, and it is increments that Congress 
examines. By using the total amount requested and the total amount appro-
priated, Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky's formulation does not "represent 
behavioral rules," 13 as they purport to. Their basic problem lies in the 
inability of their model to reflect incrementalism as the budgetary actors see 
it. 
All of the behavioral budgeting literature stresses the incremental nature 
of the budget process, so much so that criticisms of budgeting practice often 
center about its incrementalism. Demands for an overall appraisal of total 
requests are heard from reformers disturbed by the presentation and consid-
eration of only the increments over last year's budget. These demands, in fact, 
were instrumental in the creation of the PPB system. Wildavsky' s The Politics 
of the Budgetary Process and the works of other scholars present the concept 
of the agency's budget base, usually its last appropriation, which is considered 
by both Congress and the agency to be sacrosanct. 
That the base (for our purposes, last year's appropriation) is not considered 
to be fair game by the budgetary actors is manifested in many ways. Consider 
that the budget justification materials given to Congress spell out in many 
places the increases requested over last year's base and the purposes to which 
the increases are to be put. Questioning in the hearings focuses on the 
requested increases. The prose portion of Congressional appropriations re-
ports almost always concentrates on the reasons for allowing or disallowing the 
increments requested. The tabular summaries of committee action in the 
13 Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, 1971, pp. 292, 295-97. 
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reports always have a column showing the amount cut by the committee. And 
the annual Senate Document titledAppropriations, Estimates, Etc., which is 
a compilation of all data related to appropriations, also tabulates the cut the 
Congress as a whole took from the agency requests. All of this points to the fact 
that Congress specifically attends to the increments and not the total amount 
requested. 
Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky's formulation of the relations obtaining 
between Congress and the agencies unfortunately implies that budget evalua-
tion is zero-based because their variables are the total request and total 
appropriation. Although they consider their equations to "represent be-
havioral rules," given the points just considered, their equations do not. If we 
are interested in explanation of phenomenon, congruence between the model 
and the behavior to be explained is very desirable. Therefore, to be accurate in 
specifying the relationship between request and cut, we must examine only 
what Congress attends to: the increments. Hence the following variables will 
be used: 
REQ = this year's request - last year's appropriation 
CUT = amount Congress disallows of the REQ 
The general model then says that 
CUT= a· REQ 
To test our hypotheses we must compare the "a's" for the equation estimated 
from fllCed and open-ended workload data and from adequate and inadequate 
technology data. Evaluation of the "a's" is by regression analysis. Using 
ordinary least squares we estimate the following equations: 
adequate technology activities 
CUT = /31 · REQ 
inadequate technology activities 
CUT = /32 · REQ 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that a2 < a1 while 
hypothesis 2 predicts that /31 < /32. 
DATA 
open-ended activities 
CUT= a1 · REQ 
fixed task activities 
CUT = a2 · REQ 
Data for this study consist of the appropriations requests of 9 agencies (as 
approved by the Bureau of the Budget) and their appropriations for the period 
FY 1952-66 and for 3 agencies for a slightly shorter period. These 12 agencies 
were chosen according to three criteria: 1) variation in size, running from less 
than 100 to over 5000 employees, with a corresponding range in budgets; 2) 
simple funding structure; i.e., almost all money is received in annual appro-
priations and not in trust funds, revolving funds, or permanent appropriations 
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TABLE 1 
Agency and Activity Technology Workload 
Open-
Adequate Inadequate Ended Fixed 
Bureau of Labor Standards 
Record keeping on union registration 
and pension plans X X 
Promoting safety and worker benefits X X 
Bureau of Public Debt 
Securities and bonds processing X X 
Selling savings bonds X X 
Commodity Exchange Authority 
Restraining commodity market 
manipulation X X 
Food and Drug Administration 
Regulation of food and drug 
manufacturing X X 
Research on effects of drugs , 
additives, etc. X X 
Narcotics Bureau 
Prevention of drug traffic X X 
Office of Business Economics 
Analysis of economy , compute GNP X X 
Office of Saline Water 
Water desalinization research X X 
Office of the Treasurer 
Pay and service government checks X X 
Patent Office 
Process patent applications X X 
Wage and Hour Division 
Enforcing minimum wage laws X X 
Study effects of minimum wage 
increase, etc . X X 
Weather Bureau 
Provision of weather reports X X 
Meteorological research X X 
Women 's Bureau 
Promotion of Women's status X X 
that would unduly constrain cutting; 3) all of the agency's activities had to be 
either" service," regulatory, research, or promotional in nature, or a com bina-
tion of them. These activities were chosen because they represent much of the 
activity the federal government engages in and because by choosing a number 
of activities we would maximize the variation in the nature of agency opera-
tion. Seven of the agencies carried out only one activity, while five engaged in 
two. Table 1 details the agencies and their activities. Since our theory says that 
the agency's activity is what Congress reacts to, the total agency request and 
cut are not the units of analysis, but the request and cut for the activity are. 
Numerical data were gathered from the budget documents. Also, over 
90% of the House Appropriations hearings for the 12 agencies involved for the 
period from FY 1954 to 1968 were read. The hearings are the regular scene of 
formal interaction between Congress and the agencies, wherein there is 
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detailed presentation of agency operation and Congressional inquiry into that 
operation . The hearings also yield information about the adequacy of the 
agency's technology and the open-endedness of its workload . To illustrate the 
kind of evidence that is available in the hearings , to show that the variables 
used reflect real aspects of budget behavior , and to give some examples ofhow 
the agency data were coded , the following data drawn from the hearings are 
presented. 
The inadequate technology of the Narcotics Bureau , for instance , was 
expressed quite openly by its Director, Dr. Anslinger , in the hearings for FY 
1956 when he said of traffic in drugs , 
But to stop th e source of supply, you could use the Army , the Navy , and 
the Marines and you could not stop it . We might seize 10 percent , but we 
could never do better than that. 14 
Similarly , when William Neal , National Director of the Savings Bond Division 
of the Bureau of Public Debt was asked what the yield would be in sales of 
savings bonds if the sales staff activities were increased , he replied 
I would not say that if you doubled our field staff that we would double our 
sales. Somewhere you reach a point of diminishing retums. 15 
Not only is technological inadequacy noted by the agency executives, but 
such knowledge is also possessed by higher administration officals. For in-
stance , Secretary of Labor Mitchell during the hearings for FY 1959 in 
speaking about increasing the size of the Wage and Hour Division 's staff 
echoed the words cited above when he testified , 
There is a point of diminishing returns here . You can put on hundreds of 
more investigators and probably find more violations . It is a question of 
whether or not that is an economical thing to do .16 
Contrariwise, when an agency 's technology is adequate this is often noted. 
Representative Gary in the FY 1964 hearings praised the operation of the 
Bureau of Public Debt by saying to its Director, 
Mr. Merritt, this committee has always taken pride in the work of the 
Bureau of Public Debt and the way it has conducted a very efficient and 
economical operation. I am glad to see you are continuing in the tradi-
tion.17 
The research done by the Office of Saline Water was so successful that by 1958 
it had cut the cost of water desalinization to half of what it was when the 
research began ;18 and , by 1962 the cost in some areas was down to about one 
14 Hous e Appropriations Committe e, "Treasury Departm ent Appropriations Hearings for 
FY 1966," p. 270. 
15 Ibid ., p. 201. 
16 
"Labor Departm ent Appropriations Hearings for FY 1959," p. 20. 
17 
"Treasury Department Appropriations Hearings for FY 1964," p . 318. 
18 
"Interior Department Appropriations Hearings for FY 1959," p . 59. 
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quarter the original cost. 19 The hearings are replete with statements in favor of 
the agency. A typical supportive comment comes from Representative Jen-
sen, 
Just how long it will take before we can take water out of the ocean, 
especially for the use of irrigation , is another thing ; but I have great 
confidence that in a few years we are going to be able to desalt water 
cheap enough to use it for municipal purposes. 20 
As Fenno's study has illustrated, Congress is aware of the distinction 
between agency controllable and uncontrollable activities . In this sample the 
same holds true. For example, Rep. Winfield Denton, speaking about a 
request to follow up a project complained, 
Of course , the trouble I have seen since I have been on this committee -
and I have been on this committee a comparatively short time - is this: 
we grant money for a temporary project, and then we find there is 
nothing more permanent than a temporary project. They never get 
through with it. 21 
The agencies also recognize that some operations are open-ended and subject 
to agency control. Speaking of the research activities carried out by the 
Weather Bureau, Dr. Reichelderfer, its director , admitted that , 
Well, in research, of course, there is no limit to the funds that might be 
put into projects .... 
That is, research is a progressive thing. Perhaps we will learn enough this 
year so we will need more next year. 22 
The hearings also give ample evidence of agency and Congressional 
awareness of fixed workloads. The Bureau of Public Debt Director , Merritt, 
noted that fixed nature of his workload. 
The volume of work to be performed under this activity stems primarily 
from the sale and redemption of savings bonds. The workload base cannot 
be controlled by the Bureau of Public Debt but is dependent on the sales, 
service and redemption functions the Bureau is called upon to perform. 23 
Similarly, Robert G. Watson, the Commissioner of Patents , said of his organi-
zation, 
It is well for me to emphasize that the work which the Patent Office is 
called upon to accomplish does not expand and contract at the option of 
those who are charged with the duty of preparing and presenting its 
19 
"Interior Department Appropriations Hearings for FY 1964," p. 1264. 
20 "Interior Department Appropriations Hearings for FY 1957," p . 20. 
21 
"Labor Department Appropriatfons Hearings for FY 1958," pp. 98-99. 
22 "Commerce Department Appropriations Hearings for FY 1955," p . 427. 
23 "Treasury Department Appropriations Hearings for FY 1954," p. 147. 
10 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
budget. The amount of work to be done is governed almost entirely by 
public demand. 24 
The agencies' activities were coded as being either adequate or inadequate 
in technology and as having an open-ended workload or one fixed outside the 
organization. The coding is shown in Table 1. 
For completeness' sake the rationale for each coding is briefly detailed 
now. Because they are basically paper handling and record keeping opera-
tions, the securities and bond processing of the Bureau of Public Debt, the 
union registration and pension plan filing activities of the Bureau of Labor 
Standards, the check paying and servicing operation of the Treasurer 's Office, 
Patent searches, and weather data collection and analysis were coded as 
having adequate technology for their tasks. There is no basic difficulty in 
processing routine data. 
The remaining activities coded as having adequate technology were all 
involved in some research that bore fruit. As mentioned above the Office of 
Saline Water was successful in its endeavors, the FDA research can identify 
toxic and dangerous drugs, the Office of Business Economics can investigate 
the state of the economy and compute the GNP, the Wage and Hour Division 
was able to evaluate the effects of the increase in minimum wage, and the 
Weather Bureau was, through weather-satellite research , able to predict the 
weather better. 
Contrariwise, the bond selling activities of the Bureau of Public Debt, 
promotion of worker safety by the Bureau of Labor Standards, and the efforts 
of the Womens Bureau to advance the status of women were coded as 
inadequate in technology. These and the regulatory activities of the FDA, the 
Commodity Exchange Authority, the Wage and Hour Division , and the 
arcotics Bureau all attempt to modify human behavior, a rather refractory 
material to work on as some of the quotations above indicated. 
The paper handling and record management activities of the Patent Office, 
the Bureau of Labor Standards, the Bureau of Public Debt, the Office of the 
Treasurer, and the Weather Bureau were coded as having a fixed workload 
since they cannot expand their activities easily , being bound to process an 
input beyond their control. The regulatory activities were also considered to 
have a fixed workload, because there are only so many drug pushers, market 
manipulators, wage cheaters, or pharmaceutical producers to be restrained. 
Granted, these limits may be high and in fact unreachable. But, as the 
quotations above indicated, Congress recognizes the practically unattainable 
workloads and , speaking of "points of diminishing returns," can be conceived 
of as regarding the workload as fixed. In any case , the workload is beyond the 
regulators' control. 
24 
"Commerce Department Appropriations Hearings for FY 1954," p. 313. 
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Promoting the sale of savings bonds, seeking to advance the place of 
women, and attempting to ameliorate the conditions of worker safety were 
considered to have an open ended workload because the activities or projects 
in those areas are determined by the initiative of the bureaucracy and not 
primarily by demands or inputs from the environment. The remarks of the 
Weather Bw-eau director about the expansiveness of research activities in his 
bureau characterizes the open-ended nature of work in all research agencies. 
Since the work is not input from the outside but is internally generated, 
mostly by professionals within the organization , its expandability is clear. 
FI DI GS 
The regressions estimated from the data are displayed in Table 2. These 
results substantiate hypothesis 1. Requests from agencies engaged in fixed 
workload activities are cut 39% on the average, while the average cut from 
requests for open ended activities is 52%. Both of these "cutting percentages" 
are significantly different from zero, and the small size of the standard errors of 
the coefficients means that it is highly unlikely that the difference between the 
cutting percentages is due to chance. 
The relationship between the cutting percentages of the adequate and 
inadequate activity requests is completely contrary to our expectations. The 
regressions show the adequate technology activity requests are cut 48% while 
requests for activities that have inadequate technology are cut only 34%. 
Congress, apparently is more lenient to requests from agencies that cannot 
really "deliver the goods." In tl1is case again the coefficients are significantly 
different from zero and tl1e standard errors of the coefficients are so small that 
it is very unlikely that the inadequate technology cutting percentage actually 
exceeds tlrnt for adequate technology activities. 
TABLE 2 
Cutting Behavior Equations 
Open-ended activities 
CUT = .5189 REQ 
SE = .036 
Fixed task activities 
CUT = .3938 REQ 
SE = .040 
Adequate technology activities 
CUT = .4807 REQ 
SE = .047 
Inadequate technology activities 
CUT = .3378 REQ 
SE = .026 
r = .827 
r = .614 
r = .644 
r = . 776 
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Both hypotheses were based on the assumption that Congressional deci-
sion rules in th e appropriations proc ess were guided primarily by an economy 
and efficiency orientation. The results displayed in Tabl e 2, howev er , indicat e 
that while Congr ess does treat various classes of bureaucratic operation differ-
ently, th e basis of that difference is not universally an economy and efficiency 
orientation. Th e actual agency output at times takes second place to more 
symbolic products . Congr ess apparently is slow to cut a lot from promotional 
and regulatory activities. Who , it might be argued, is against furth er pros ecu-
tion of narcotics peddl ers and market manipulators , and who can object to 
selling savings bonds or promoting th e status of women? Certainly not Con-
gress . Though it may give lip service to efficiency, in some instances the 
illusion of output and the image that the government is "fighting the good 
fight" is more important than saving money that cannot promis e a sure return . 
This res earch suggests that symbolic considerations ent er into the pictur e. 25 
On e of th e original motivations in the study was to identify characteristics 
of agencies that would explain variation in how Congr ess reduc ed the requests 
of various agencies. To determin e Congressional behavior th e data base used 
was the requests and cuts from 12 agencies all togetl1er . This established that 
Congress did cut agencies differ entially on the basis of the technology and 
workload characteristics of the request being considered. The real test of the 
explanation offered would be whether it allows explaining th e variation in th e 
"cutting percentag es" among agencies. Table 3 displays the "cutting percent-
ages" tl1at characterized each individual agency or agency activity in the data 
set. 
25 Up until now the cutt ing behavior has been ascribed to "Congress." Most appropri ations 
decisions are made , however, by the appropriations subcommittees. It is possible , therefore, that 
variatio n in cuttin g behavior might depe nd on the particular Senate and House Appropriations 
subcommittees that in fact make the bud get decisions. To explore this possibility, the hypotheses 
were tested, where data allowed, for each set of Hou se and Senate subcommitt ees that were 
involved . The result s were basically the same within subcommittees as we have found across 
subcommittees. 
It was possible to test the workload hypotheses within thr ee subcommi ttees: the Commerce, 
State and Justice subcommittees , the Labor and HEW subcommit tees, and the Treasury sub-
committ ees. The hypotheses relating to technology could only be tested on the Labor-HEW and 
the Treasury subcommi ttees, as the requests before the Commerce subcommittees were all 
adeq uate technology requests. 
In all the subcomm ittees both of the hypotheses were corrobora ted in that the re lative size of 
the regress ion coefficients were in accordance with that predicted. While there were some 
differences in the cutting percentages from one set of House and Senate appropriations subcom-
mittees to another, within each set of subcomm ittees the same mechanisms attribut ed to 
Congress as a whole still operated. 
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TABLE 3 
Results of CUT = a REQ on Agency Activities 
Agency-activity Ci 
Adequat e techn ology and fi xed workload 
Bureau of Publi c Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7730 
Bureau of Labor Standard s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5284 
Patent Office........... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3907 
Office of the Treasur er . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3869 
Weath er Bureau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2264 
Inadequate technology and open-ended workload 
Bureau of Public Debt .... . ................. , . . . .. . . . . . . .7187 
Bureau of Labor Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3952 
Women's Bureau .... . . . ... . ... . . . . ... ................. . -. 2285 
Inadequat e technology and fvced workload 
Food and Drug Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3522 
Wage and Hour Division . .... . . . ... . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2208 
Commodity Exchang e Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 
Narcotics Bureau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0629 
Adequate technology and open-ended workload 
Office of Business Economic s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6097 
Weather Bureau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6043 
Office of Saline Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4941 
Food and Drug Admini stration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4309 
Wage and Hour Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3620 
SE of a r 
.139 .786 
.046 .965 
.132 .781 
.299 .042 
.095 .619 
.133 .825 
.134 .429 
.234 .177 
.058 .751 
.107 .545 
.236 .450 
.101 .464 
.118 .762 
.126 .844 
.079 .867 
.155 .897 
.131 .507 
The correlation coefficients for the agency activities are , with two excep-
tions , reasonably high. This indicates that the model is relatively congruent 
with reality and that the blanket application of th e basic cutting model did not 
cause any major problems. Although the correlations here are not as good as 
those in the Davis, Dempster , and Wildavsky research , given that we are 
dealing with first differences , the correlations ar~ sufficiently high . 
The power of the technology and workload variables can be tested by 
comparing the "cutting percentages ." We split the "cutting percentages" into 
high cuts (those greater than or equal to the median cutting percentage ) and 
low cuts (those less than the median cutting percentage ). The cross tabulations 
are shown in Figure I. 
FIGURE 1 
Technology Workload 
cutting Adequate Inadequate Fixed Open 
percentage 
;;.: median 7 2 3 6 
< median 3 5 6 2 
x 2 = 1.417 x 2 = 1.s16 
p < .20 p < .20 
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Since the significance level is only. 20 we cannot hold that the variables are 
separately very sb·ong in explaining why the cutting percentage of one agency 
exceeds that of another, although they do have some influence in the pre-
dicted direction. 
If , however , the combined force of the two variables are brought to bear , 
we see some stronger explanation. The results from the regression equations 
predict that the most leniently treated activities have an inadequate technol-
ogy and a fixed workload; in our sample these are the regulatory activities. 
Conversely the most harshly treated activities have an adequate technology 
and an open ended workload, which are the research activities in the sample. 
If the two variables working together are powerful we would expect the 
cutting percentages of the research activities to exceed those of the regulatory 
activities. As Table 3 indicates, this is indeed the case. Hence we conclude 
that the technology and workload variables allow some explanation of the 
differential cutting behavior of Congress. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The research was undertaken to investigate variation in cutting behavior 
by Congress. It treated requests for activities with a fixed workload more 
leniently than it did those with open ended workloads; this was in concordance 
with the belief that Congress operated with an economizing value structure. 
Contrary to expectations, however, Congress treated requests for activities 
involving an adequate technology more severely than it did those with an 
inadequate technology. This second pattern was not consistent with a purely 
economizing model of Congressional behavior . More symbolic or at least 
nonefficiency values thus seem to characterize some Congressional behavior 
in the budgeting arena. 
An attempt was made to explain the variation in cutting behavior experi-
enced by the agencies in the sample by using the regularities determined 
above. There was only limited success in explaining the severity of cutting by 
utilizing the two variables by themselves. Together, however, they fully 
explained the higher cutting percentage of one group of agency activity over 
the cutting percentage of an "opposite" group of agencies. 
Although the sample was not random , the results do indicate that the 
technology and the openendedness of agency activity are tools that explain 
why Congress treats agencies differentially in the budgeting arena . It cer-
tainly indicates that it is possible to explain variation in Congressional budget-
ing behavior in terms of agency character and points to the probable fruitful-
ness of further research in this area. 
